The Baby M case 1 has forced us to take sides in the public debate over surrogate motherhood. Last year, advocates of this form of noncoital reproduction praised the New Jersey trial court 2 for supporting the freedom to contract for such "womb renting" services, while critics warned that enforcement of such surrogacy contracts would condone the sale of babies and the exploitation of women as baby factories. In its unanimous opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court sided with the critics. 3 Based on New Jersey's adoption law and public policy, the court refused to enforce the contract that provided money to a surrogate mother in return for her agreeing to be artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman's husband, to conceive a child, to carry it to term, and to relinquish her parental rights and surrender her child to the natural father and his wife, regardless of the child's best interests. The court believed that its "declaration that this surrogacy contract is unenforceable and illegal is sufficient to deter similar agreements." 4 The court was particularly offended by the payment of money in exchange for bearing and relinquishing a baby. "There are," it said, "in Karen H. Rothenberg a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy." 5 Payment of money to the surrogate was "illegal, perhaps criminal, and degrading to women." 6 The court found "no offense" to present laws where a woman serves as a surrogate without payment, provided she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child. 7 Nor did it preclude the legislature from altering the statutory scheme to permit surrogacy contracts, within constitutional limits-limits that the court did not define and that are not easily definable.
The court concluded its ninetyfive-page opinion with a prediction-and perhaps a hope for the future:
Legislative consideration of surrogacy may also provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the overall implications of the new reproductive biotechnology .... The problem can be addressed only when society decides what its value and objectives are in this troubling, yet promising, area. 8 Perhaps this is why legislatures have had so much trouble passing laws in this area. Although bills have been introduced in the majority of states, as well as Congress, to either ban or regulate surrogacy, most have died in committee. The Baby M decision, however, has stimulated debate and has influenced the direction of recent legislation. New Jersey's Supreme Court is well respected nationwide for its leadership in analyzing complex ethical issues. What impact will its analysis have on those states where surrogacy contracts will continue to be written in a legal wasteland? For couples desperate to have':a child, for women desperate for money, and for brokers desperate to get rich, the risks may still be worth taking.
But what about the role of the health professional in the surrogacy process? What issues have been clar- To put such questions in some context, it is worth noting that nineteen amicus briefs were filed with the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case, expressing various interests and views on surrogacy. In fact, the court specifically acknowledged that many of them were helpful in resolving the issues. 9 Yet not one brief was filed on behalf of a healthprofessional association. One can only speculate that such groups did not view the Baby M case as a relevant case of nationwide importance and/or that they had not officially considered their positions on surrogacy. Not one of the major mental health associations, including the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association, had officially considered the issue. In fact, very little evidence has appeared in any of the scientific journals on surrogacy. Either the Baby M decision will increase demand for evidence on the effects of surrogacy or it will dry up interest. Or, perhaps, the issue is just too controversial for health-professional groups struggling for consensus.
Yet as early as 1983, the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Executive Board of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) issued policy statements on surrogacy.
10 As late as September 1987, the ~-\..c'viA affirmed its opposition to surrogacy to the Drafting Committee on the "Status of Children of the New Biology" of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: "Surrogate parent contracts do not represent a satisfactory reproductive alternative for those who wish to become parents." 11 The AMA opposed state legislation to sanction such arrangements.
Although ACOG is reevaluating its position in light of the Baby M decision, its present ethical guidelines do not condemn the practice. They do, however, express "significant reservations about this approach to parenthood." Of particular concern is the difficulty of differentiating between payments for the service of carrying the child and the payment for the child itself-clearly a practice that is "illegal and morally objectionable." ACOG also warns against investing in surrogacy businesses or accepting money for 14 Unfortunately, this experiment will not answer the current concerns about the enforceability of the surrogate contract and the custody of the child. In fact, a few members of the committee questioned whether, given the small number of couples involved, it was likely that significant research would be performed. Others would not endorse a procedure that was so highly controversial and whose risk-benefit ratio did not justify support.
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In spite of the fact that these groups did not play an active role in the Baby M appeal, the court's decision and its potential impact on the surrogacy contract continue to raise a number of unanswered questions for the health care professional. Will participation in such arrangements carry a taint of immorality-and perhaps a threat of criminality? Will exposure to professional liability increase with more demand for screening, counseling, and evaluation? Will future regulation place health care professionals in the role of "guarantors" of the agreement? At various stages of the surrogacy process, the professional is faced with a number of complex questions, many with no answers. By examining the Baby M case and its surrogacy con-114 tract, this article highlights these unanswered questions and the implications for health care professionals.
The "Perhaps Criminal" Role The Baby M case was a dispute about a contract and the custody of Baby M, not about criminal liability. Yet the court stated, albeit in dictum, that the surrogate arrangement was "perhaps criminal" under New Jersey law. 16 What are the implications of this confusing phrase?
New Jersey law prohibits the use of money in connection with adoptions. Violation of this "baby selling" law is a high misdemeanor, a third-degree crime carrying a three-to five-year prison term. 17 Excepted are fees of an approved agency and payment or reimbursement for medical, hospital, or related expenses incurred in connection with the birth of the child. Although the Baby M contract provided that the fees paid were for services and expenses, the court concluded that the parties knew it was nothing other than a privateplacement adoption for money. The contract provided for "the sale of a child, or at the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchas'e,rs is the father." 18 The court concluded that the evils that prompted the prohibition against the payment of money in connection with adoption are present in the surrogacy arrangement. In both cases, "the essential evil is the same, taking advantage of the woman's circumstances (the unwanted pregnancy or the need for money) in order to take away the child." In the court's view, it was the middleman-the surrogate brokermotivated by the profit motive, who promotes the sale. The profit motive-and not the best interests of the parties-"predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction."
The court never mentioned the role of the health professional in the context of the baby-selling prohibition. Yet the taint of immorality and possible criminality permeates the court's analysis. To date, twentyfour states have enacted laws prohibiting baby-selling. 20 If babyselling laws are interpreted to cover the surrogacy arrangement, they may be interpreted broadly enough to subject a health care professional to criminal liability for his or her participation. 21 Moreover, since Baby "\f was decided, at least five states have passed statutes restricting commercial surrogacy. 22 The Baby ~1 contract provided for artificial insemination, for a fee, by a physician. The contract provided for evaluation, for a fee, by a psychiatrist. The contract provided for the inseminating physician, for a fee, to make judgments about genetic testing. Health professionals legitimized the "medical" aspects of the process. By their actions, they sanctioned the deal. Without the involvement of the health care professionals, would the surrogate arrangement be as profitable? Would it continue to be characterized as a reproductive "technology"? Does the participation of the health care professional-although not critical to the deal-contribute to its success as a "medical" solution to infertility? Unless the health care professional also serves as a broker, referral service, and/or owner of a surrogacy agency, it is highly unlikely that there would be fair notice under most existing state laws to be criminally liable. 23 Yet the charge of "aiding and abetting" a crime would not be out of the question.
A more realistic fear for the health care professional may be the impact of characterizing the surrogacy process as immoral, illegal, and "perhaps criminal." Will professionals want to take the risk? Will health professionals disassociate themselves from surrogacy? At what price? Criminalization of surrogacy may drive the business underground, without sufficient quality
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control. In the meantime, without further legislative clarification, the hint of potential criminality should at least cause those professionals participating in a surrogacy contract to analyze their role throughout the process. In the end, they may be faced with even more unanswered questions.
Pre-Insemination: Evaluation, Counseling, and "Informed Consent"
Contrary to all the protection provided for counseling prior to termination of parental rights, the court found that the surrogacy contract did not provide for "counseling, independent or otherwise, of the natural mother, no evaluation, no warning." 24 The lack of counseling and evaluation reinforced the court's determination to void the agreement.
Apparently the only psychological evaluation performed on Ms. Whitehead took place almost two years prior to her agreement with Mr. Stern. According to the trial court, Ms. Whitehead received a "psychological evaluation to determine her suitability as a potential surrogate candidate" at the Infertility Center of New York (ICNY). Although the "examiner" thought it important to explore her ability to relinquish the child in more depth, she was recommended as an appropriate candidate. "It was this fact of prior evaluation that the Stems relied on."
2 5 According to the trial court, Ms. Whitehead also testified that she received two counseling sessions at ICNY, a point ignored by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court raised a number of concerns about the role of evaluation and counseling. It questioned whether the evaluation served anyone but ICNY. 26 Nothing in the record stated that the evaluation was for the surrogate's benefit. To the contrary: Ms. Whitehead testified that all she was told was that "she had passed." 27 The Sterns never asked to see the evaluation. They assumed that ICNY had made an evaluation and "had concluded that there was no danger that the surrogate would change her mind."
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The court stressed the fact that a psychologist had warned that Ms. Whitehead demonstrated cer_tain traits that "might make surrender of the child difficult and that there should be further inquiry." The court speculated that to inquire further may have jeopardized the deal, believing that the "profit motive got the better" of ICNY.
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The court ignored the provision in the contract that specifically stated that a "psychiatric" evaluation was to be arranged for both Mr. and Ms. Whitehead, to be paid for by Mr. Stern, and that the Whiteheads were to sign a release permitting dissemination of the evaluation report to ICNY or the Sterns.3° Did this evaluation ever take place as The facts are not clear from the record. What is clear is that the court envisioned a process of both evaluation and counseling. A more in-depth evaluation would have focused on the likelihood of Ms. Whitehead changing her mind, while extensive counseling would have alerted her to the potential impact of relinquishing her child.
Should the mental health professional be in a position to guarantee that a mother won't change her mind or that her consent is voluntary? Is this an assessment that the court would agree was impossible until after birth?3 1 How would the professional make such assessments? What traits, in fact, should the professional look for-stability, pecuniary motives, detachment, The court speculated that if either the Sterns or Ms. Whitehead had been told the details of the evaluation, the agreement would never have been made. 33 The evaluation, if shared, might have warned both parties and put them on notice. The court pointed out that both parties suffered severe emotional distress, which could have been avoided with proper evaluation and full disclosure and counseling. 34 Yet the contract between Mr. Stern and ICNY made it quite clear that ICNY would "not guarantee or warrant" that the surrogate would comply, including, but not limited to, her "refusal to surrender custody of the child upon birth."35 Mr. Stern also specifically released ICNY from any liability "related to or arising from any agreement or understanding between himself and a 'surrogate mother' located through the services of ICNY."3 6 The court questioned whether, even with sufficient evaluation and counseling, a surrogate could ever grant "informed consent" to the terms of the surrogate contract. Tra- ditionally, informed consent requires that the patient be told of the risks and benefits of the treatment options. For the trial court, informed consent was defined as a "concept used in the trial of medical malpractice cases." The trial court rejected Ms. Whitehead's argument that until she "felt the emotion of birth and sensed the child, she could not give informed consent at the time she signed the contract." To accept this expanded concept of informed consent would put "all contracts in limbo."37
On the contrary, the Supreme Court was concerned not so much with informed consent to a medical procedure (the insemination procedure is a simple, non-material risk) but, rather, with the consent to relinquish the baby at the time of signing the contract. The court embraced a broad definition of informed consent that is somewhat foreign to contract law. A standard contract requires only that both parties are competent at the time the agreement is made. In fact, the contract stated that both parties "freely and voluntarily" signed the agreement. 38 Perhaps the court deemed it "impossible" and/or "impracticable" for a natural mother to consent to relinquish her child until a reasonable time after birth. Without any scientific evidence cited, the court took judicial notice that the "natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child." In the "most important sense" her decision is "uninformed."39
As a practical matter, what should the consent process include? Is a health care professional qualified to disclose the medical, psychological, legal, and financial risks and benefits of the surrogate contract? How certain is any of this information? The medical risks associated with insemination and pregnancy are currently to be disclosed. But what about the long-term psycho-logical risks to the parties, their families, and the child? Furthermore, the uncertainty of the legal and financial issues clouds consent even more. At best, "informed consent" will be a warning to all potential parties about all foreseeable risks.
Some states may attempt to regulate surrogacy by delineating standards for screening, evaluation, counseling, and informed consent prior to the signing of a contract. For example, recent proposals require the surrogate and the natural father to submit to physical and genetic screening. The surrogate may also be required to undergo psychological evaluation to determine whether any medical disability would prevent her from abiding by the terms of the contract. A few proposals require that a licensed marriage counselor, psychologist, or psychiatrist certify that "the consequences and responsibilities of surrogate parenthood" were explained to the natural father and his wife, that "the surrogate had the capacity to consent," and that "the potential psychological consequence of her consent" had been discussed. 40 Proposals in Connecticut and Hawaii, for example, prohibit insemination unless the "physician is professionally satisfied with the mental and physical suitability of the surrogate and the natural father."4 1 Such requirements seem to put the health care professional in the position of "guarantor" of the surrogacy process. Will professionals have to guarantee or warrant that the mother will not change her mind, that the medical and genetic makeup of all the parties proves acceptable, that the psychological evaluation assures no problems, and that the parties have been warned of all risks?
Such attempts at regulation may transform surrogacy from a commercial enterprise to a medically controlled reproductive choice. With more involvement of health care professionals, will the surrogacy process be legitimized? Is this a role that health care professionals want to accept? If so, who will monitor their compliance with the standards? Will such a role increase professional liability? What will the standard of care be for assessing their role in the pre-conception deal? And what if the deal falls apart? The legal and ethical risks should force health care professionals to become more involved in evaluating proposals for surrogacy regulation.
Insemination
In the typical surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate candidate is artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman's husband. This process does not require any complex reproductive technology. A physician's expertise is not essential. In fact, artificial insemination can be done at home with a turkey baster. State laws regulate artificial insemination to varying degrees. 42 In a few states it is a criminal offense for anyone other than a licensed physician to perform artificial insemination. 43 The Baby M contract specifically provided that the surrogate would be "artificially inseminated with the semen of the natural father by a physician. "44 Although contracts may vary as to the role of screening and evaluation at the pre-conception stage, it is clear that the physician takes a role in beginning the conception process. Prior to each attempt, the sperm donor and the surrogate should be screened for sexually transmitted diseases. As in the Baby M case, insemination may be tried a number of times before conception occurs.
The health care professional's involvement is necessary for the surrogacy contract to proceed (assuming the parties reject the at-home turkey-baster method and sexual intercourse}. The physician benefits financially from this process. He or she is paid a fee for this service and may have contracted with the surra- Once insemination is successful and conception occurs, the contract may provide for a continuing role for the inseminating physician. How does the surrogacy contract shape medical decision-making, and how does it affect the health care professional?
The Baby M contract set out a number of specific terms related to prenatal care. First, Ms. Whitehead agreed not to abort unless, "in the professional medical opinion of the inseminating physician" it was necessary for her "physical health" or the child had been found to be "physiologically abnormal." Furthermore, "upon the request" of the inseminating physician, she would agree to "undergo amniocentesis or similar tests to detect genetic and congenital defects. " 45 These provisions place all the decision-making authority with the inseminating physician. What relationship does this physician have to the surrogate? What role does her independent obstetrician have in her care? To what extent does the inseminating physician know of her physical health-and what about her emotional health? Does the inseminating physician take orders from the surrogate agency and/or those who pay his or her fee? Will the profit motive "get the best of" the physician under these circumstances? In spite of the contract, it was Mr. Stern's wife, a physician herself, who insisted that Ms. Whitehead undergo amniocentesis. The actual role of any other physician is unknown from the record. Would the surrogate and the natural father have a cause of action against the physician for negligence if they could prove the physician caused the stillbirth? Could the mother sue for the difference of the $g,ooo and her expenses? Could the father sue for all his expenses? Obviously, if the contract is unenforceable, the con-. tract remedy would not be available; but what about a potential negligence case? Could all parties establish a duty of the professional to provide a perfect, final "product"?
The Baby M contract did provide that if prenatal testing revealed any defects, the surrogate, "upon demand" of Mr. Stern, would abort the fetus or forfeit the money.49 Even the trial court determined that this provision was clearly void and unenforceable.so Relying on Roe v.
Wade,5' it found "[t]hat only the woman has the constitutionally protected right to determine the manner in which her body and person shall be used." 52
In anori}er contract provision ignored by both courts, the surrogate would agree "to adhere to all medical instructions given to her by the inseminating physician as well as her independent obstetrician."53 But what if there had been a conflict between the physicians? Was Ms. Whitehead the patient of both physicians? 54 Did she have a relationship only with her independent physician? And if so, why should the inseminating physician have a role in her prenatal care? Because the contract said so? And which physician's instructions was she to consider?
The contract further set out that Ms. Whitehead was not to "smoke cigarettes, drink alcoholic beverages, use illegal drugs, or take nonprescription medications or prescribed medications without written consent from her physician. " 5 5 Which physician was this? What if she had told her "independent" physician that she had been drinking or smoking cigarettes in violation of the contract? And what if she had missed a scheduled appointment as set out in the contract? Was her physician supposed to write these facts in the chart because they are medically relevant, or should he or she not put such facts in her record because they violate the contract? Should the physician report compliance or lack thereof to anyone else? Should a copy of the contract and its terms be placed in the surrogate's medical record? What if she gives the contract to her physician or the surrogate agency sends it to him or her? Should the physician-whose interest is in protecting the welfare of the patient and the fetus5 6 - ignore the contract and act as if it doesn't exist?
Since her "independent obstetrician" is not part of the business deal, maybe the surrogate will not tell this physician about the contract. Does she have a reason to "deceive" her doctor? Would the doctor and the staff treat her differently? Her physician might be better off not knowing about the terms of the contract and its "rules" on medical decision-making. It certainly would make the situation less complicated. Yet this information may be relevant to her prenatal care. What if her blood pressure began to rise? Such a reaction could be due to the ambivalence she feels about giving up the child--or maybe she fears that if she refuses to give up the child she will be sued. And what about the stress that her husband may feel about her pregnancy? 11aybe her children are pressuring her not to give up the baby. Shouldn't her physician have this information? The physician may believe that the stress of the arrangement is causing psy- What benefits the surrogate medically may not benefit her financially if she refuses to relinquish the baby. Is this a risk the surrogate assumes? Should the natural father pay all these expenses as foreseeable under the arrangement, whether or not the mother decides to keep the baby? The Baby 11 contract provided that the natural father should pay all expenses "not covered or allowed by her present health and major medical insurance, including all extraordinary medical expenses and all reasonable expenses for treatment of any emotional or mental conditions or problems related to said pregnancy." 57 What is deemed "reasonable" expenses for "emotional problems"? Who makes this determination? If counseling results in the surrogate's decision not to relinquish the child, is the surrogate financially liable? If the natural father pays, does he have a role in directing the medical and psychological care provided? In the end, it may be the physician who ultimately determines the "success" of the surrogacy deal for all the parties. The health care professional will be forced to balance the patient's needs with financial, legal, and ethical uncertainties.
The Birth
When Baby M was born, no one on the hospital staff appeared to know that the baby was the "product" of a surrogate contract. The disappointment of having a less than perfect child is hard for any parent to accept. It is also one of the most difficult problems for the physician to work out with parents. In fact, hospital ethics committees have been formed to assist the medical staff and family make complex ethical and medical decisions about treatment for severely defective newborns. To further complicate matters, the physician and the hospital staff would have to figure out which possible parent speaks on behalf of the best interests of the child.
There have been a few failed attempts to regulate decision-making at the time a surrogate mother gives birth. Some proposals would give authority to the natural mother through birth and immediately thereafter, 62 while others would shift authority at the time of viability to the natural father and his wife. 6 3 For the physician and the hospital staff, it seems safest to place these decisions with the natural mother, assuming that she is acting in the best interests of the child. But what if the natural mother then relinquishes the less than perfect baby to the natural father, pursuant to the contract? He may not want the "damaged goods" either; the child could be abandoned by all parties. 6 4 In a recent case reported in the New England Journal of Medicine, a surrogate mother passed HIV infection to the fetus. Neither the surrogate nor the natural father wanted custody of the infant. 6 5 Even if a natural father is granted custody, he may not have had a role in the medical decisionmaking process at birth. The physician may not have known of the surrogacy arrangement. Faced with significant medical and related expenses for his defective child, the father, having had no input into the medical decisions involved, may Law, Medicine & Health Care look for a "deep pocket" to sue. Both the health care professional and the hospital will face an increasing risk of liability from all parties.
Conclusion
Baby M was not a case about health care professionals. Yet examination of the surrogacy contract reveals the importance of the health care professional as a player in the process. From the initial evaluation of the surrogate mother through the birth of the contracted-for child, health care professionals face a number of complex legal and ethical questions. Many of these questions have no answers. If state legislatures begin to regulate surrogacy, health care professionals will be expected to assume an increasing role as "guarantors" in the process. This is a role that the health care professional should not accept without a clear recognition of the inevitable conflicts.
